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The task of anthropology, then, becomes clearer. The individualized cultures are the data for anthropological effort as the individual is object material for the psychologist. What are the laws that apply to these cultures? What results from cultural contact and contagion? What is the rôle of the individual? How do cultures reflect progress in the arts, in ideas, in ethical achievements? Is this progress constant or intermittent, and perhaps backward as well as forward moving? Do the several cultures furnish us repetitions, in various form, of the same themes of social, and of individual struggle and success, or do the motives and methods fall into non-intersecting spheres?

But why proceed with an enumeration that must be endless? There are problems of cultures as surely as there are cultures, and there are cultural traits as surely as there are individual traits. To minimize the importance of cultural traits is perhaps the best evidence that we possess them in preeminent degree.

What is now most urgently required for ethnology, said Mr. H. Calderwood some years ago,¹¹ is that some one should do for that science what Kant did for philosophy, attempt a scientific separation of the necessary from the accidental. When this day arrives anthropology, like philosophy, will enter upon a new era of a critical turning upon itself, and will not lose itself, as previously, in facts, but find itself there; for facts will be, for it, illustrations of the laws which they exemplify.

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A NOTE ON DR. STRONG'S REALISM

THE difficulty I find with Dr. Strong's view (as set forth in *The Origin of Consciousness*) is not so much in the threefold classification of objects, essences, and egos, as in an insufficient analysis of the second class, "essences"—or rather of one subdivision of that class.

The essence of a thing, as I understand him, is its "what," as distinguished from its existence, the same whether it exists or not, its quality or character, or, as one might say, its nature or idea. Evi-

philosophique, Vol. 52 (1901) by Bouglé, *Le Procès de la sociologie biologique* esp. p. 142 et seq.); Tarde, *La réalité sociale*; Berne's *l'Individu et société*; Gaston Richard, *Le Réalisme sociologique*; and Gustave Le Bon's review of *L'Année sociologique*.

¹¹ See his review of E. B. Tylor's *Primitive Culture*, in *Contemporary Review* (1872), p. 222.

dently to ask what the nature of a supposable thing is, and to ask whether it exists, are distinct exercises of the mind. My difficulty is with his view of the nature or essence of certain objects, *i. e.*, of a certain class of essences. I refer to *sensible* objects, as distinct from those that can only be thought of, pictured or imagined; their essence seems to me insufficiently described, or perhaps realized. Instances are hot or cold air, sweet or sour-tasting food, fragrant or ill-smelling flowers, loud or low voices, heavy or light weights, colors of the various kinds. What is the essence of an object so far as it is hot or cold, sweet or sour, fragrant or the reverse, loud or low in tone, heavy or light, red or green? I get no clear and satisfying answer from Dr. Strong—and so far as he gives an answer I suspect that in a vital point it is mistaken.

With the general logic of his view, I find no fault—at least in this note. Grant that there are objects independently real (whether in space and time is perhaps a secondary matter); grant that there are essences of those objects, *i. e.*, their distinct and special character, separable in thought at least from the objects themselves; grant even that the essences may in a sense be real, even if not given, like the objects themselves—that consciousness or awareness or attention (they are to my mind substantially equivalent expressions) is not necessary to their being. All the same, the essences of sensible objects seem to me imperfectly or even, in one particular, incorrectly stated.

Let me at once indicate my point. Dr. Strong speaks of the essence “a cold object,” or the essence “a [ringing] bell” (p. 40). He argues that what we wake up to, when consciousness first begins, is not events or feelings within ourselves, but things outside—and I entirely agree with him. We are primarily aware of sensible objects, not of our awareness or feeling of them.¹ But what is the nature or essence of these sensible objects? Evidently this is a question for reflection, for analysis—the primitive mind probably never considered it. Indeed, I suspect that the primitive mind was ever more primitive than Dr. Strong imagines. I doubt if it had any such distinct notion as “things outside,” for this would imply the notion of “things inside,” and the antithesis of inside and outside is probably an acquired one. I doubt even if it had any notion of objects as distinct from subjects. What it had, I suspect, was simply experiences like cold, hot, loud, soft, sweet, sour, hard, heavy, red, green, without distinguishing them from itself, or itself from them—there being no separate self as yet from which they could be distin-

¹ “No metaphysical doctrine could be empirically more false than that which says that our earliest, our primary objects are psychic states” (p. 40).

guished. I doubt even if it could be said, when thinking of them, to posit their *existence*, for this implies doubt, questioning, and is an act of judgment. There were simply cold, hot, *etc.*, *etc.*, and outside, inside, existence, *etc.*, were predicates born of later reflection. But apart from all this, which is mostly if not entirely speculation, what does the essence "a cold object" or "a sounding bell" mean to us now—or, to visualize the question more distinctly, what is the essence of an object *so far as it is cold*, or of a bell *so far as it sounds* or more simply still, what is the essence cold or loud?

Other people's consciousness may differ from mine, but so far as I can get any clear idea of what I mean when I speak of cold, it is a certain sort of feeling—something I may have at times or I may think of others as having, but in either case feeling, and when attributed to beings without power of feeling (if there are any), meaning little or nothing. A cold object then is one that gives me this feeling, when I am anyway in contact with it, or would if I were. I am aware that many people think that the cold is in the object and would be there whether any one had a corresponding feeling or not; but this, to my mind, is simply a very pardonable confusion, doing no practical harm and probably practically useful, and therefore not worth disputing about with those without scientific interest in the subject. In speaking in this way I do not deny, but rather assert that there is an object, *i. e.*, something independent of me which somehow produces or excites the feeling in me.

So with the sound of the bell, with odors, with tastes, with resistances, pressures or weights—they are my (or some one's) feelings, sensations, immediate experiences, not anything outside me which could exist by itself. The feelings are of very different kinds, and have themselves all manner of different subdivisions and shades, but they all have the common quality of being feeling, a state of some one's sensibility and apart from sensibility are meaningless. A feeling is hard to define, perhaps as an elementary kind of thing it is impossible of definition; but we all experience it without definition and know pretty well what the word stands for. Dr. Strong says, "A pain that we did not feel would, we rightly say to ourselves, be no pain—at least for us" (p. 204);² and we may say the same (according to my analytical reflection) of cold and sound and even resistance and weight—weight unfelt is as little weight as pain unfelt is pain. Undoubtedly there are things giving me this wide variety of

² Dr. Strong does indeed in one place (p. 199) speak of a feeling that is not "felt," but I think he means here introspected (he adds at once "or introspected"), and introspection is an intellectual exercise, connoting consciousness and attention, while feeling is not. That introspection is something secondary and not vital to feeling is certainly true.

sensation—the feelings do not come from nothing—and the things must sometimes be very complicated in their inner structure to account for the varieties and delicate shadings of feeling in us; and yet the feelings are one thing and the exciting objects are another.³

Color, it must be admitted, is a more puzzling case. *Prima facie* it seems outside us—itself a separate reality. We *look* at it, it is not our feeling—so we instinctively say; and I confess that direct analysis of our consciousness does not settle the question, as it seems to the nature of cold or weight; color may be an independent reality that we simply come upon. It is somewhat strange, however, that it is not commonly put among the primary qualities of matter, even by realistic philosophers, but is classed along with sound as a secondary quality, *i. e.*, one dependent on relation to sentient beings of some sort. Dr. Strong says positively enough, “objects appear colored, but we know that they are not really so—that what exists is a ‘texture of insensible parts’” (p. 228);⁴ so the grass “is not in fact green” (p. 100). Now this is as much a violation of our instinctive belief (common sense), as the assertion that the cold or the weight is not in the object—we naturally believe that we come upon these, as truly as upon the color. And if we are, as I think, indisputably under an illusion in these cases, why may we not be in the other?⁵ Still argumentation of this sort settles nothing, and I own that in taking color as a feeling rather than an independent reality, as I do now, I follow a variety of general considerations (which I will not go into here), rather than any assured result of introspective analysis.

But, if I may leave this rather limping statement as to color out of account, the essence of sensible objects in general comes to be something like this: they are objects *begetting* (or giving occasion to, exciting, evoking—I will not say just what is the proper form of ex-

³ Just how the objects are related to feelings is another question, perhaps largely theoretical. Do they cause them, or simply by their action excite them, acting thus as a stimulus? Professor Woodworth (*Psychological Review*, XXII., 22) speaks of a percept as an inner reaction to a sensation; I incline to think that a sensation itself is a reaction to an outside stimulus (I learned the view from the late Dr. Edmund Montgomery, but it is not uncommon among reflecting psychologists).

⁴ Dr. Strong thinks, with the physicists, that “the color is not so much in the object as in the reflected light” (p. 228); but why the reflected light should not be equally in itself a “texture of insensible parts” I fail to see. The undulatory theory gives us waves, motion, not light, though they may of course produce (excite) light in beings like ourselves.

⁵ William James spoke of red, blue, as feelings along with cold, heat, pleasure and pain, sound, *etc.* (*Psychology*, II., 618—*cf.* the expressions, “somebody must feel blueness, *etc.*,” II., 7, “when feeling a color, *etc.*,” II., 113).

pression) certain *feelings or sensations in us* ("us" meaning sentient beings in general, or at least sentient beings of our type, whether human or subhuman, or, for that matter, superhuman, if there are any). The point is that feeling belongs to the *essence* of sensible objects; it is a part of their nature or idea; without it, they are not sensible. There may be objects that are not sensible, not hot or cold, not bitter or sweet, not fragrant or noisome, not loud or soft, not heavy or light, not red or green or of any color, but sensible objects of these types have feeling as an essential part of them—it is not an addition, but belongs to their being.

So far as I can gather, Dr. Strong does not admit this, or realize it. He speaks of "objective green" and of the green in sensation, as if the two were different, the latter a vehicle by which the former is apprehended by the mind—at least so I understand his language on p. 100. He distinguishes between "sound as an external fact" and "sound as a feeling" (p. 197—*cf.* p. 202). So he speaks of "objective heat" (p. 313). In this case it is possible that he only means the greater activity of the molecules of an object, which is the objective basis or counterpart of heat; but in another place, in referring to touching a hot object, he distinguishes the heat in the object from the heat in the touching member, and even says of the savor of a taste of soup that it may be felt both as a quality of the soup and as a sensation in the mouth (p. 81). I may lack in fineness of observation, but I am unable to discriminate between these things. The heat of the object is my feeling of it (existing perhaps or at least localizable in my finger); if there is any heat properly speaking *in* the object, it must be that there is something there feeling it too. So the savor or quality of the soup is my sensation of it, though it may have a complication objective basis and very fine work on the part of the cook have been necessary to make it possible for me. I may be mistaken in my reading of Dr. Strong's thought, but as I read it, it seems to involve an unnecessary duplication of things. There is apparently the sensible object outside of us,⁶ and then by means of an elaborate mechanism the same object gets inside us—only not the

⁶ *Cf.* the detailed descriptions on p. 93, of such charming simplicity that I become almost skeptical of my own position as I read them. I only recollect that the hardness, sweetness, fragrance, *etc.*, described, may possibly after all be essences without reality, and I think to myself that I should rather have them if only as feelings than a possible ghost. (*Cf.* the language, p. 175, "The first character of the essence is that it is not an existence. The essence is, as we have seen, the object without its existence, and therefore a mere ghost or vision of the object, the same in sense-perception as in hallucination.")

object itself, but the essence of it, sensible qualities included,⁷ its existence at this stage of the game being simply an assumption. My objection is that the nature of those sensitive qualities is not realized, their essence not perceived. There is no object with its sensible qualities outside us, there is only an object giving (or arousing in) us certain feelings or sensations which we call its sensible qualities, and do no harm in so regarding for all the practical purposes of life. In short, we need no *vehicle* to convey what is outside to us inside; we need only the action of the outside on the inside—objects and sentient beings are enough, and *sensible* objects are the result of their interaction.⁸ “Essences” are a useful and perhaps necessary distinction for thought purposes, but they are not a necessity for the explanation of sensible knowledge (knowledge of sensible things). It is actual heat, sound, weight, red that we experience in sensation, not merely the essence of them; in sensation they have all the reality they ever have—though what lies back of them in the outside object is another question.

Indeed, the result of Dr. Strong's particular type of realistic thinking seems to be that we hardly know reality at all—we only assume it. He does, it is true, say that we perceive not sensibles but sensible objects, but it turns out that what he means is not

⁷ Dr. Strong even speaks of visual or tactile sensations bearing in their own nature “the *impress* of the object” (p. 122, italics mine—cf. what is said of correspondence in respect of qualities, extension, *etc.*, on p. 112, also p. 140; and of the visual sensation as “a sort of duplicate or picture of the object” on p. 129), thus suggesting the copy theory, though it would not be fair to press the language. Aristotle appears to have had a similar dualism, according to H. W. B. Joseph (*Mind*, October, 1910, p. 468), who speaks of his “notion about the reception in the αἰσθητήριον of the αἰσθητὸν εἶδος (the εἶδος = Dr. Strong's “essence”); *e. g.*, in touch, the heat, or cold, which may be said to be the form of the tangible body, as a state of it, is received in the organ of touch by its becoming similarly hot or cold; . . . similarly in hearing, the κίνησις, which is the form, of the sounding body, is reproduced in the συμφωνος ἄρπ of the ear.”

⁸ One of Dr. Strong's problems (p. 112) is “How can a sensation or a mental image convey an essence [*i. e.*, a physical one]? How, being a psychic state with different characters and having, as such, one essence, can it cause another essence to appear?” The problem seems to me to arise from the artificial chasm he has put between the essences in the first place. The sensible qualities are psychical essences *ab initio*. Cold, weight, *etc.*, are as much psychic as pain is, though it may require a little reflection, *Selbstbesinnung*, to realize it. This is not saying, after Berkeley, that the *esse* of sensible objects is *percipi*, nor even that the *esse* of sensible qualities is *percipi*, but simply that the *esse* of these qualities is *sentiri*—a very different proposition. Feeling and perception are distinct—feeling of itself is not cognitive at all (Dr. Strong uses *sentiri* as equivalent to cognition or at least consciousness on p. 195, which I think fails to note its distinguishing mark).

existing sensible objects, but the *essence* sensible objects. "What is given in sense-perception is not the object as an existence, but only the object as an essence" (p. 36). "Given essence and actually existing object are mutually independent" (p. 51). In this way he thinks it possible to explain hallucinations, where there is "givenness of an object when no object exists" or "perceiving objects where no objects exist" (pp. 51, 62). However this may be (and for my own part I think that hallucinations should be classed with imaginations rather than sense-perceptions), we know, according to his view, only essences—their existence, embodiment in an object, being an addition and an assumptive one.⁹ We act as if there were real objects—that is about all he can say.

All this is in reference to external reality. But is it possible that, in accordance with Dr. Strong's method of reasoning, the question may be raised as to the reality of our knowledge of psychic states, such as sensations, pain and pleasure, desire, emotion and volition? Do we know these things themselves, or only their essences? "In perception," he says, "the essence and the existence of the object divide" (p. 40); how is it in introspection? "Owing to the subjective mechanism of the givenness of essences, the truth of any given act of cognition can only be presumptive" (p. 41)—does this hold only of physical essences? "Consciousness is only of essences" (p. 44)—is this a *general* statement?

The question is somewhat intricate and I shall proceed tentatively. That there are the two kinds of essences, in his view, appears plain ("there are two kinds of essence: the essence 'a physical object,' which is the kind given in sense-perception, and the essence, 'an emotion,' 'a desire,' 'a feeling of pleasure or pain,' which is the kind given in introspection," p. 89). In speaking of the visual after-image (pp. 194 ff.), which he calls a psychical existence, he says that it is given only as an essence. Moreover, pleasure and

⁹ Dr. Strong does indeed speak of knowledge of the object (*cf.* p. 43), but as above explained it is really knowledge of its essence; the object itself, the existing thing is, he repeatedly says, simply assumed, presumed, asserted, affirmed, believed in. The affirmation is "instinctive" (p. 40); we possess "a well-nigh irresistible instinct to act as if objects existed" (p. 222). Once he gives a sort of definition: "Cognition is extremely simple; it is nothing but the givenness of an essence and the acting as if an object existed" (p. 40). Givenness without affirmation being expressly denied to be knowing, the characteristic mark of the latter comes to be *acting as if* an object existed (*cf.* p. 111, affirmation "is to be explained as merely the implication of acting as if the object existed"). Instinctive affirmation, then, or even "acting as if"—such is the reduction of knowledge, and, I am tempted to say, its degradation! Is it not better to keep the honorific word for what is worthy of it? Dr. Strong, even speaks of "erroneous cognition" (p. 41). This to me is something like "false truths"—or is it only a question of terminology?

pain, emotion and will are in this respect put on a par with it (p. 95)—so apparently they, too, are given only as essences (all this in connection with argument for another purpose, but the implications seem to be as stated). On p. 194 (*cf.* p. 199), he distinctly asks the question, is introspection “dependent on a mechanism analogous to that underlying perception cognition?” As nearly as I can make out, the answer is affirmative, with a possible exception. There may be direct cognizance of a feeling for the instant it lasts (so I interpret a parenthetical explanation on p. 200), but this sort of cognition is practically negligible, for the next instant the feeling may be gone and the cognition of it be possible only through memory.¹⁰ Now in memory, the object, *i. e.*, in this case, the feeling is only given as a mental image, and it is through this primary memory-image that introspective (as distinct from perceptive) cognition takes place. It would appear then that to this extent introspection is vehicular like sense-perception—images, essences, not the things themselves are what is given. “The feeling is given by means of a vehicle, which is the primary memory-image”—such is his language (p. 207). He enlarges on the fact that the image in this case is a repetition of the feeling with almost equal vividness, so that the vehicle is adapted to render the object with almost perfect adequacy (p. 208, *cf.* p. 231); still the vehicle is different from the object, and we only know the latter through the former, not directly. Indeed, our cognition may in this way not only be incomplete, but (to retain Dr. Strong’s use of language) erroneous. There may be imaginary feelings. “In truth,” he says, “there is as much difference between an imaginary pain and a real one as there is between an imaginary horse and a real horse” (p. 90). Yet the essences of an imaginary pain and a real one are the same, *i. e.*, essences are no evidence of existence and essences are all we directly know. When we speak of knowing pain, then, what we mean is that we know the essence pain and simply assume its existence. Either that, or knowing an imaginary pain and knowing a real one are the same thing—“knowing” here meaning a certain sort of intellectual act or relation introspective of the reality of its object, in accordance with the sense in which Dr. Strong and many others appear to use the term at the present time.¹¹ I do not wish to press this line of criticism and am only developing what seems to be a matter of fact, the logical implication of his general view, and am

¹⁰ The interesting psychological refinements as to how memory is possible, its intimate nature (pp. 199 ff), I pass over.

¹¹ I say “appear,” for sometimes (as on p. 220) Dr. Strong uses cognition in the stricter sense, speaking of cognition as “really such,” *i. e.*, with an object really there, “there as it appears to be.”

open to correction. His thinking is infinitely refined, and I may miss some of its nuances.

Is not the trouble (so far as there is trouble—I do not wish to be too dogmatic) with the vehicular theory itself? The alternative it involves “is either to be skeptics or to take things on trust” (p. 222). But do we need to take feelings on trust, knowing only their essence, not their reality? I think not. Do we need to take cold, hot, sweet, sour, loud, soft, heavy, light, red, blue, on trust? I think equally not. And these being real, directly real, may they not involve other things, which if not directly may be equally real—by real in all cases meaning existing independently of cognition of them, or of consciousness or thought or perception or whatever the specific *intellectual* exercise may be? Essences are a valuable distinction, as I have said, for thought-purposes, but as such, *i. e.*, as separable from reality, they exist only in thought, and have no part in an ontological or epistemological explanation of things.¹²

And yet I may add that with the intention of Dr. Strong to develop a tenable critical realistic doctrine I am in entire sympathy. I could even use some expressions of his as my own. He speaks of the “power of the object to evoke” the feeling (p. 199)—this, said of the “tertiary” qualities of external objects, such as “fearful,” “hateful,” “soothing,” is what I should say in connection with the sensible qualities that have been under discussion. So when he says, “the object known is actually there at the moment acting on the senses, and . . . determining by its action the character of the psychic state” (p. 113), I quite agree. So also when he speaks of “states of our sensibility” as “symbols of objects,” or of the sensation as the “index” of the object—these being for practical purposes—I agree. I should agree, too, entirely with the remark, “sense-perception is a relatively external way of knowing, which shows us the relations of things but not their inner nature” (p. 125)—a remark which I consider very pregnant for future theoretic construction.

I have, of course, dealt—and that imperfectly—with only one of the lines of thought, and perhaps a subsidiary one, in this rich and many sided volume.

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¹² Under “Requirements of Logic” Dr. Strong puts “the object must be kept free from admixture with the psychic state;” but if sensation, feeling, is included under “psychic state,” the requirement is pure assumption. So under “Requirements of Psychology” he puts “The knowing must be vehicular” (pp. 188-89). But with all respect to Dr. Strong, I incline to say of these “musts” what David Friedrich Strauss said of the “Christian consciousness,” which apologists of his day sometimes sought to make normative over the results of scientific criticism of the Bible, *mulier taceat in ecclesia*.